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Tricarichi v. Coöperatieve Rabobank, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 73175 (May 2, 2019)1
CONSPIRACY-BASED THEORY PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Summary
The Court determined that (1) Walden v. Fiore did not overrule Davis v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, meaning that Nevada, under its long-arm statute, recognizes conspiracy-based theory
personal jurisdiction and utilizes the conspiracy jurisdiction test as laid out in Gibbs v. Prime
Lending and (2) Tricarichi failed to establish personal jurisdiction under either specific or
conspiracy theory personal jurisdiction due to an inability to provide sufficient evidence
connecting the respondents actions to Nevada.
Background
Michael Tricarichi, president and sole shareholder of Westside Cellular, Inc. (an Ohio
corporation) received approximately $40 million from a civil lawsuit settlement. Fortrend
International, LLC (a now defunct San Francisco corporation) proposed Tricarichi engage in an
improper transaction known as a “Midco transaction” to avoid paying double taxation on the
settlement. Tricarichi lived in Ohio when negotiations began for the transaction in March 2003.
However, he moved to Nevada in May 2003. Fortrend’s affiliate, Nob Hill, Inc., sent Tricarichi a
letter of intent to purchase Westside in July 2003. To facilitate the Midco transaction, Fortrend
contacted Coöperatieve Rabobank, U.A. (a Dutch corporation with its principal place of business
in the Netherlands) to request the loan to finance the Westside purchase, which would then be
repaid by Westside once the purchase closed. To facilitate this transfer, Westside opened an
account with Rabobank, and the documents for this account listed Tricarichi’s Nevada address.
On September 9, 2003, Tricarichi sold Westside to Nob Hill. Nob Hill, utilizing a loan
from Rabobank’s subsidiary Utrecht-America Finance Co. (a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in New York), transferred the funds to Tricarichi’s Rabobank account,
which Tricarichi then transferred to another bank account he controlled in New York. Shortly
thereafter, Tricarichi resigned from Westside, and Nob hill told Tricarichi that his tax liability for
2003 would be satisfied and agreed to indemnify him against Westside’s tax liability. Nob Hill
also warranted that it did not intend to cause Tricarichi to engage in an improper transaction.
Westside (now owned Nob Hill), allegedly partially relying on advice it had received from
Seyfarth (a Chicago law firm) regarding a similar transaction, made a series of financial maneuvers
to offset the settlement income and thereby claim it had no income tax liability for 2003. However,
when the IRS audited Westside’s 2003 tax return, the Midco transaction and following financial
maneuvers resulted in Westside being assessed over $21,000,000 in tax deficiency and penalties,
which Westside itself did not pay due to lack of assets. The IRS thus held Tricarichi liable as a
transferee. After the tax court determined that Tricarichi had constructive knowledge of the
improper transaction and was therefore liable, Tricarichi filed a complaint in Nevada district court
against Rabobank, Utrecth, and Seyfarth for numerous claims, including civil conspiracy. All the
opposing parties filed motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the District Court
granted, holding that (1) Tricarichi had not shown that the respondents engaged in conduct in or
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directed at Nevada and (2) Nevada did not recognize conspiracy-based theory personal jurisdiction
because Davis was overruled by Walden. Tricarichi then appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court.
Discussion
Specific Personal Jurisdiction
In order for specific personal jurisdiction to be proper in Nevada, the cause of action must
arise out of the defendant’s contacts with Nevada.2 The Court declared that the two factors to
consider when making this determination are (1) if the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of acting in Nevada or purposefully targeted its conduct towards Nevada and (2) whether
the cause of action arises from the defendant’s purposeful contact in connection with Nevada. 3
For making this determination in tort actions, the Court endorsed the “effects test” laid out
in Calder v. Jones, which considers whether the defendant (1) committed an intentional act (2)
expressly targeted at the Nevada (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered
in Nevada.4 The Court, utilizing Walden v. Fiore as guiding precedent, further elaborated that the
proper focus is not on a defendant’s contacts with residents of Nevada, but rather the defendant’s
contacts with Nevada itself.5 In Walden, the Court held that although the defendant’s conduct was
directed at plaintiffs with known ties to Nevada and effected the plaintiff’s when they returned to
Nevada, this effect was insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction because the conduct itself
occurred in Georgia, and it did not result from anything occurring in Nevada itself.6
Respondents did not purposefully direct activities at Nevada
Applying this precedent, the Court analyzed whether Tricarichi had established that
defendants Rabobank and Utrecht had directed their actions at him in Nevada. Tricarichi’s main
supporting evidence for this contention was documentation he sent to Rabobank and Utrecht
during the course of the Midco transaction that contained Tricarichi’s Nevada address. This
included his resignation, wire transfer instructions, and documents regarding opening an account..
However, the Court held these contacts with Nevada insufficient. First, the Court pointed out that
these documents were actually sent from a San Francisco fax number. More significantly, the
Court emphasized that the respondent’s acts of receiving the documents were merely incidental to
the activities that made up the Midco transaction itself, and that all the primary activities of the
Midco transaction had occurred outside of Nevada. The court held that such ancillary conduct and
contact with Nevada does not show the necessary “purposeful availment or express aiming”
needed for establishing specific personal jurisdiction.
The Court similarly held that Tricarichi’s claim that he suffered personal injury in
Nevada was also insufficient to establish the required “minimum contacts” necessary to exercise
specific personal jurisdiction. The court, citing Walden, held that merely suffering injury in
Nevada is not enough by itself because this would allow the Plaintiff’s contacts with the forum to
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determine the jurisdictional analysis.7 Therefore, because Rabobank and Utrecht’s acts that caused
the alleged injury were not connected to Nevada, the Court held that Tricarichi’s injury suffered
in Nevada because of these acts was by itself insufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction.
Tricarichi’s claims do not arise from respondent’s activities in connection with Nevada
The court then analyzed whether Tricarichi’s claims against Rabobank and Utrecht arose
out of their activities in connection with Nevada. The only alleged Nevada contact by both
Rabobank and Utrecht was the fact that they knew that Tricarichi used his Nevada address on bank
account opening and loan closing documents. The Court held that this knowledge did not have the
required direct relationship to the Midco transaction, which was the foundation of Tricarichi’s
various claims. This slight Nevada connection was merely ancillary because the transaction
required that money be transferred by Rabobank through New York accounts to facilitate the
purchase of an Ohio Corporation, made possible by Utrecht’s New York loan. Since this primary
conduct occurred outside of Nevada, the court ultimately found that even though the account
opening and loan documents listed Tricarichi’s Nevada address, it was ultimately inconsequential
to the overall transaction at the heart of his claims. The Court concluded that Tricarichi’s failure
to identify any “jurisdictionally significant conduct” by the defendants meant that minimum
contacts were not established and that specific personal jurisdiction was therefore improper.
Conspiracy theory jurisdiction
In the alternative, Tricarichi claimed that Rabobank, Utrecht, and Seyfarth were subject to
Nevada jurisdiction under a theory of conspiracy-based jurisdiction because they were allegedly
participants in a conspiracy that injured a Nevada resident. The respondents (and the District Court
below) argued that (1) Nevada does not recognize a conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction and
that (2) Walden precludes conspiracy theory personal jurisdiction because it overruled Davis.
The Court began its analysis by describing conspiracy jurisdiction, stating that the theory
allows for a co-conspirator without sufficient minimum forum contacts to be subject to personal
jurisdiction based on a co-conspirators sufficient contacts.8 To establish such jurisdiction, the
plaintiff must prove that (1) there was an agreement to conspire, (2) the acts of co-conspirators
establish minimum contacts with the forum state and (3) the co-conspirators reasonably expected
that they would be subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum when they entered the conspiracy.9
The Court, emphasizing its previous decision Davis v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
ultimately held that Nevada’s long arm statute does allow for the exercise of conspiracy theory
personal jurisdiction.10 In Davis, the Court had concluded that nonresidents engaged in a
conspiracy to gain control of a Nevada estate could reasonably be subject to Nevada’s jurisdiction
because the injuries and much of the conduct regarding the conspiracy occurred in Nevada.11 The
Court also disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion that Walden overruled Davis, because
Walden itself did not involve a conspiracy or discuss conspiracy theory jurisdiction, meaning
Davis was distinguishable, not overruled, and still valid precedent. Although Davis did not lay out
7
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an explicit test for conspiracy theory personal jurisdiction, the Court held that its facts supported
embracing the three-part Gibbs test (described above).
However, although the Court overruled the district court’s conclusion that Nevada did not
recognize conspiracy theory personal jurisdiction, it still held that Tricarichi failed to show
“pertinent co-conspirator jurisdictional facts.” Tricarichi alleged that Rabobank and Utrecht had
been knowingly financing illegal Midco transactions and that Seyfarth’s advice to Westside was
relied upon by Westside when it claimed a deduction on its tax return in 2003. In addition,
Tricarichi ultimately alleged that in March 2003, all the respondents conspired to induce him to
engage in the illegal Midco transaction.
The court did not address whether these allegations were true. Rather, the Court held that
even assuming arguendo that Tricarichi’s assertions were true and the first prong of the Gibbs test,
which requires a showing of a conspiracy, was met; the second prong, which requires a showing
that the acts of the co-conspirators establish minimum contacts with Nevada; and the third prong
which requires a showing that the co-conspirators reasonably expected that they would be subject
to Nevada’s jurisdiction when entering the conspiracy, were not met.
Tricarichi’s main evidence asserted for establishing conspiratorial minimum contacts were
letters of intent to purchase Westside sent by Nob Hill in July and August of 2003. However, the
Court pointed out that these letters were not part of the initial solicitation to conduct the improper
Midco transaction, because the negotiations between Fortrend and Tricarichi began in March or
April of 2003, months before his move to Nevada. The Court held that since the initial solicitation
occurred elsewhere, these letters were merely incidental to the initial solicitation that occurred
outside of Nevada and therefore do not satisfy the minimum co-conspirator contacts with Nevada
required to establish conspiracy theory personal jurisdiction. Similarly, the Court also held that
prong three could not be established, because the Midco transaction concerned an Ohio corporation
transferring funds to New York. Since none of this conduct concerned Nevada, there was no
evidence to support the idea that the defendants knew their conspiracy would have consequences
in Nevada when they entered the conspiracy.
Conclusion
The Court ultimately concluded by again emphasizing that under Nevada’s long arm statute
and under the still valid precedent of Davis, Nevada recognizes conspiracy theory based personal
jurisdiction as valid. However, although the District Court was incorrect in its analysis and
rejection of conspiracy theory personal jurisdiction, the Court affirmed the lower court’s order
dismissing the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction because Tricarichi failed to provide
sufficient evidence for either specific or conspiracy theory personal jurisdiction. Tricarichi failed
to show the necessary jurisdictionally significant link between the respondents and Nevada
necessary for specific jurisdiction, and the fact that Tricarichi suffered injury in Nevada is not in
and of itself enough. For conspiracy theory jurisdiction, Tricarichi failed to allege sufficient
conspirator acts necessary to establish minimum contacts and also failed to demonstrate that the
respondents reasonably expected that their actions would have consequences in Nevada when they
entered the conspiracy.

